Wittgenstein compares philosophical explanations with explanations in aesthetics and ethics.
Connections with Wittgenstein's other remarks on his philosophical approach
To explain how Wittgenstein's remarks on his philosophical approach can help to understand the aesthetics-ethics comparisons, consider the following remark on the contrast between metaphysical philosophy and Wittgenstein's own approach. The latter he describes as a conceptual investigation concerned with conceptual questions rather than factual questions, a distinction which, according to him, remains unclear in metaphysical philosophy. Like any factual investigation, a metaphysical one puts forward true/false assertions or theses about its objects of investigation, although it does not conceive itself as concerned with merely contingent facts. Wittgenstein writes:
Philosophical investigations: conceptual investigations. The essential thing about metaphysics: that the difference between factual and conceptual investigations is not clear to it. A metaphysical question is always in appearance a factual one, although the problem is a conceptual one. (MS 134: 153/RPP I: §949; cf. BB: 18, 35) One could be excused for wondering whether this has anything to do with the remarks on aesthetics and ethics, and whether Wittgenstein's critique of metaphysics has any connection with the aesthetics and ethics comparison. Indeed, insofar as we regard his critique of metaphysics as central to his later philosophy -as I would certainly do -, such a lack of connection might naturally be taken to indicate the superficiality of the comparison with aesthetics and ethics. However, that an intimate connection exists becomes evident in Wittgenstein's next remark that clarifies the contrast between factual and conceptual
investigation, and explains what a conceptual investigation is or what it does:
What is it, however, that a conceptual investigation does? Does it belong in the natural history of human concepts?-Well, natural history, we say, describes plants and beasts. But might it not be that plants had been described in full detail, and then for the first time someone realized the analogies in their structure, analogies which had never been seen before? And so, that he establishes a new order among these descriptions. He says, e.g., "compare this part, not with this one, but rather with that" (Goethe wanted to do something of the sort) and in so doing he is not necessarily speaking of derivation; nonetheless the new arrangement might also give a new direction to scientific investigation. He is saying "Look at it like this"--and that may have advantages and consequences of various kinds. (MS 134: 154/RPP I: §950) 3 As Wittgenstein explains, a conceptual investigation is not an empirical or factual investigation of our concepts or of the linguistic practices in which they find their expression.
A conceptual investigation does not seek to establish facts about language use, analogously with a natural historical investigation of plants or beasts, and in this sense it does not constitute a special branch of natural history: the natural history of the language use of humans. 4 organizing in a novel way the factual knowledge that a natural history has already collected.
Hence, although a conceptual investigation does not aim to establish facts, it has its own kind of significance. As Wittgenstein notes, a new conceptual order or a new way of looking at plants "may have advantages and consequences of many kinds", inclusive of it giving a new direction to factual, scientific investigation.
The notion of ordering or organizing calls for particular attention in this connection.
When Wittgenstein speaks in the quote about ordering things, and of articulating a way of looking at things in this way, he is referring to something the significance of which we are, I
think, very well aware, although may often fail to pay attention to it. As every museum curator presumably recognizes, and museum goers understand at least implicitly, the way in which things are placed together in an exhibition -whether an art show or in a natural history museum -can significantly influence how we perceive and understand the nature of the exhibited objects. For example, a retrospectively organized exhibition of the paintings of a painter can bring to view lines in the development of her work that would otherwise be obscured and very difficult or impossible to detect. As a consequence the paintings may appear in a quite different light. Likewise the arrangement of organisms in a natural history museum can significantly influence one's understanding of the exhibited organisms due to how it places them in, for example, evolutionary history, in relation to what went on before and what came after. As these examples illustrate, our perception of things can be significantly influenced by the way they are arranged and organized. The point is that to simply place objects side side, to arrange them in a particular way already constitutes a mode of representing them which can significantly influence our understanding of them. Such an arrangement does not only constitute a way of directing attention, but by directing attention it invites and is conducive to particular ways of seeing and conceiving the objects in question. 
The inconclusiveness of arguments and uses of false explanations
On the preceding basis we can say that, according to Wittgenstein, our understanding or appreciation of an object of interest depends, in both philosophy and aesthetics, on the adoption of specific ways of conceiving the object. This is exemplified by hearing or playing a musical phrase in a certain way as opposed to another one, and by construing the use of a linguistic expression in a certain way rather than another. In both philosophy and aesthetics we are also faced with the task of explaining and justifying to others such ways of conceiving objects. More specifically, in philosophy the introduction and adoption of a particular way of conceiving an object of study serves the purpose of solving philosophical problems, i.e. of rendering comprehensible the object of investigation, and releasing us from problems that arise in the context of some other ways of conceiving it. In this sense the justification of a philosophical account depends on its clarificatory capacity. But although there is therefore a rational basis for adopting one mode of conceiving an issue rather than another, Wittgenstein maintains that ultimately no conclusive arguments can be given for philosophical accounts in the outlined sense. The situation is the same in aesthetics and ethics. I quote again from Moore's lectures:
Reasons, he said, in Aesthetics, are "of the nature of further descriptions" […] and all that Aesthetics does is "to draw your attention to a thing", to "place things side by side". He said that if, by giving "reasons" of this sort, you make another person "see what you see" but it still "doesn't appeal to him", that is "an end" of the discussion; and that what he, Wittgenstein, had "at the back of his mind" was "the idea that aesthetic discussions were like discussions in a court of law", where you try to "clear up the circumstances" of the action which is being tried, hoping that in the end what you say will "appeal to the judge". And he said that the same sort of "reasons" were given, not only in Ethics, but also in Philosophy. ( Rather than in terms of subjective preferences, Wittgenstein explains the inconclusiveness of philosophical justifications with reference to what he takes to be a characteristic feature of the discipline: that, rather than concerned to discover and establish facts, philosophy articulates ways of organizing and arranging already established facts (PI 2009: 132; cf. BB: 44) . A philosopher invites us to conceive the facts in some such way -and it is in this connection that questions about the justification of philosophical accounts arise.
However, on the basis of Wittgenstein's account of what philosophy does, it can be readily explained why and how philosophical justifications may fall short of conclusiveness. The reason is that, especially in complex cases such as philosophy deals with, there seem to be always more than one possible way to order the facts. Similarly, it is possible to construe in more than one way the relative importance of different facts pertaining to an object of investigation so that, from the point of view of a certain way of ordering the facts, particular features of a case appear as more urgently in need of an explanation than others. 8 Facts therefore underdetermine possible ways of ordering them, as well as underdetermining which facts should be in focus when explaining a case. This under-determination of possible orderings or conceptualizations then also leaves enough room for a philosopher to follow their already settled convictions when adopting a mode of conceiving an object, and to resist alternative descriptions or conceptualizations. Arguably, this is the sense in which, if a description '"doesn't appeal to him", that is "an end" of the discussion'.
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The situation might be compared with interpreting a philosophical text: while certain readings can be relatively easily excluded as failing to account for the textual facts, to decide between some other readings may be more difficult, and sometimes it may be possible to hold on to an interpretation indefinitely, resisting any criticisms and other alternatives, because of how textual facts underdetermine possible interpretations. From this point of view, Wittgenstein's court analogy seems quite clear, too. In a court someone's action might be construed in a certain way in order to demonstrate how its various features count as evidence for criminal intent. But perhaps those details can also be put together differently so that they do not support the attribution of a criminal intent, after all. Hence, it may sometimes not be possible to demonstrate conclusively the correctness of competing ways of ordering the facts.
Analogously, it seems understandable, how disagreement can sometimes persist in philosophy on the face of agreement about facts, without any irrationality on part of the disputing parties. It is not that philosophers fail to consider evidence for and against their 8 Similarly, which concept should be applied to a case to describe it, or whether and how a rule or principle applies to a case, may sometimes be underdetermined in this way, as exemplified by questions such as whether abortion counts as murder, whether doing so and so counts as stealing, and so on. Here it may be similarly in dispute which features of the case are relevant for judging the case and for applying a concept to it. 9 Wittgenstein need not be read as suggesting that a philosopher might not have respectable reasons for what they find appealing. For example, a philosopher might consider a certain difficulty as a fair price for making a certain point that she rightly regards as impossible to give up. The question then is whether there might be a better way to do justice to this point that can also release her from these associated difficulties.
accounts. It is just that there is no conclusive evidence for the kind of accounts they put forward on the Wittgensteinian account.
It is also noteworthy how different philosophical backgrounds and commitments may influence the appeal of certain philosophical descriptions or accounts. As Wittgenstein observes, in philosophy a failure to appreciate a certain view may involve, not merely an intellectual difficulty, but a difficulty of the will.
What makes a subject difficult to understand -if it is significant, important This need not be taken to contradict the rational character of philosophy either. There may, of course, be cases where practical interests -for instance, relating to one's career spent arguing for a certain view -prevent one from seeing or admitting problems that one ought to admit.
However, ultimately a certain persistence seems part of rational conversation in that holding on to a view, and trying to stretch it to cover what it has difficulty to explain seems to be just what examining and developing a philosophical account requires. By contrast, giving up on an account very easily would not allow one to properly examine its strengths and weaknesses or to develop it further on the face of difficulties. Hence, it is not the case that a philosopher's will, their wanting to see things in a certain way and hoping a particular account to turn out as correct, is necessarily in conflict with the aspiration of philosophy to be a rational discipline.
That would be too simple.
Wittgenstein's emphasis on the importance of false theories in philosophy and aesthetics can be connected with this. As he explains in the very first quote, a false explanation is useful for finding the right explanation or it constitutes part of the way that leads to the correct one. This, I take it, is because seeing where exactly and why an account becomes possible to make less rigid and dogmatic use of the model. Rather than imposing the model onto reality and trying to make reality fit it, the model can now be used to throw light on the objects of investigation in the role of an object of comparison. In this sense
Wittgenstein sometimes speaks of using philosophical models as centres of variation, whereby the function of such a centre is to help us see a class of cases in an orderly fashion as ordered around centres to which other particular cases or types are related as variants. (MS 115, 221) This is a further way in which an account that strictly speaking does not correctly capture an actual case can nevertheless help to understand it.
To conclude, rather than to raise concerns about the rational character of the discipline of philosophy, Wittgenstein's view of the inconclusiveness of philosophical arguments could instead be used to explain the lack of agreement in philosophy as opposed to science.
Importantly, seen from Wittgenstein's point of view, the lack of agreement in philosophy need not be understood as a defect that ought to be fixed as soon as possible in order to align philosophy with science. According to Wittgenstein's view, rather than in the business of establishing facts, philosophers are in the business of spelling out modes of representing and ordering facts. As explained, in the latter case there are ultimately no conclusive arguments.
Even if it may be part of the notions of a fact that they can be agreed upon, the same need not 
